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This paper proposes a new backup protection scheme, named coordinated backup protection (CBP) scheme, for
distribution networks containing distributed generation. The proposed protection scheme takes into account the
issues faced by traditional backup protection, such as difficulty in setting parameters and complex cooperation,
and considers the features of distribution networks, such as changeable power flow because of high penetration
of distributed generation sources and insufficient measuring quantities. The CBP scheme includes two aspects:
coordinated substation protection and regional master substation protection, who also work as nearby backup
protection and remote backup protection respectively. The two protections support each other by local information
coordination and regional information sharing, in order to improve the reliability of fault identification. The configuration
principles and performances of the proposed backup protection scheme are addressed in the paper. Different fault
conditions in the IEEE 14-node system have been used to illustrate and verify the feasibility of the CBP scheme.
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Modern power systems are facing great challenges due
to the deregulation of the electricity market, environmen-
tal concerns and energy policy change. With a number of
major blackouts occurred around the world, customers’
expectation of system reliability and power quality has also
gradually increased. The growth of renewables as energy
source has promoted the development of distributed
generation [1, 2]. However, traditional electrical infrastruc-
ture cannot satisfy these development requirements, and
thus a new grid infrastructure is urgently needed. To ad-
dress the challenges facing the existing power grid, the
new concept of smart grid has emerged [3, 4].
With the wide spread application of intelligent elec-
tronic devices (IEDs), information digitization and the
IEC61850 protocol, the development of protection using
comprehensive information is greatly impelled. Extensive
studies have been carried out by researchers on how to
improve the protection performance and functionalities
by better utilization of digital and communication* Correspondence: 15121401@bjtu.edu.cn
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the Creative Commons license, and indicate iftechnologies. From the division of protection informa-
tion domain, wide area protection is based on wide area
measurement system (WAMS) to implement large-scale
system protection and control [4–9]. This kind of system
is developed from early special protection systems (SPS)
[10] and broadens traditional relay protection function
from point to surface. Narrow-sense wide area protec-
tion is a system level protection aimed at reflecting vari-
ous system disturbances through analyzing power
system wide area information and evaluating system
states. This kind of protection has better sensitivity and
effectiveness compared with traditional SPS [11]. Gener-
alized wide area protection including wide area relay
protection (WARP) helps to assist main protection to
improve adaptability, simplify cooperation strategy and
shorten action time [12]. At present, because of the
communication delays, wide area protection is mainly
applied to the backup protection and integral control of
large-scale gird. On the other hand, protection systems
whose information domain is within a substation or
within a local area network have been proposed. These
protection schemes analyze the integrated information
and make use of adaptive setting principle to realizeis distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
rg/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
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(IP) (as in [13] and [14]) integrates all the information
from a digital substation into one computer system to
form a reliable, flexible and complementary integrated
protection system. Integrated network protection (INP)
is based on IP but its information range is extended to
several correlative substations. There are some other
protections that use similar concept, referred to as aggre-
gate protection (AP) which uses other relays’ information
to improve its own protection performance, centralized
protection [15], and protection based on multi-sources
[16]. All these studies have driven the protection and con-
trol system to utilize comprehensive information to
achieve better performance and to satisfy modern grids’
functional requirements. Compared with traditional pro-
tection, there have been marked improvements.
Studies above indicate that protection based on
comprehensive information can adapt to power net-
work development. Current researches mainly focus on
analyzing integrated comprehensive data whereas pro-
tection considering coordination of different units and
functions needs further study. Moreover, comprehen-
sive data depends on global information acquisition.
However, the network states are sometimes immeasur-
able and only partial information is available from the
distribution network in practice, especially the node
voltage information. Thus the protection unit can only
get information of several important nodes and it is a
challenge to propose protection strategy based on in-
sufficient measuring quantities.
This paper proposes a solution to the above issues.
Retaining the information acquisition mode and com-
munication network of smart grid, this paper presents a
coordinated backup protection (CBP) scheme and corre-
sponding protection configuration principles. It includes
coordinated substation protection and regional master
substation protection. Coordinated substation protection
pays more attentions to the coordination and cooper-
ation among different IEDs and substations, and works
as the nearby backup protection. Compared to the existing
protection schemes, distributed IED has advantages in
terms of functional support, information utilization, and
achieving higher protection reliability. Master substation
protection mainly analyzes regional comprehensive infor-
mation and works as the remote backup protection. Con-
sidering the likelihood of insufficient state measurements,
an integrated MS protection based on centralized
searching method is proposed in master substation
protection.
In this paper, an introduction on the framework of
CBP scheme is presented in Framework of coordination
backup protection scheme section. Protection principles
section depicts the configuration of CBP and its princi-
ples are discussed in details. Case studies are carried outin Test and results section to prove the reliability and ef-
fectiveness. Finally, Conclusion section draws conclusions.
2 Framework of coordination backup protection
scheme
The CBP scheme includes coordinated substation (CS)
protection and regional master substation (MS) protection
who also work as nearby backup protection and remote
backup protection, respectively. The two protections sup-
port each other by local information coordination and re-
gional information sharing, in order to improve the
reliability of fault identification. Compared with traditional
backup protection scheme, the CBP scheme has stronger
independence and higher reliability, and at the same time,
the cooperation between CS protection and MS protec-
tion helps to decrease the risk of protection malfunction.
2.1 Coordinated substation (CS) protection
The CS is an application concept that uses the unified
communication protocol and strong information net-
work of smart grid, and at process level, accomplishes
synchronous sample value acquisition, action command
execution and breaker states uploading. Based on the
needed local information, bay level includes a number of
protection IEDs to implement protection. At the same
time, modularization structure of IED helps in harmoni-
ous interaction and coordination of functions to support
reliable fault identification which is independent to
backup protection. The coordination of IEDs includes
information sharing, redundant CPU space utilization
and coordinated backup tripping. Station level is the top
one which integrates useful data and events for substation
management and communication with dispatching center
or MS.
Part of Fig. 1 shows the structure of CS which pays
more attentions on the coordination and cooperation
among different protection IEDs. In this paper, the IED
is an extended concept which combines local protection
function with coordination concept. Every IED is an in-
tegration of functional modules and has three main
parts: function module (FM), local coordination module
(LCM) and remote coordination module (RCM). FM
mainly is the protection algorithm part, which processes
the samples received from the process bus and sends ac-
tion commands to the breaker. At the same time, FM
can communicate with other IEDs to share information
or provide coordinated trip signal in order to improve
protection reliability and security. LCM monitors the re-
quirements of local IED, establishes appropriate tasks
and sends task commands. RCM receives remote com-
mand from other IEDs and analyzes their requirements,
or receives remote information and uses it in local pro-
cessing. The protection of CS uses ownerless structure
[17] and can work reliably even if one IED fails. In this
Fig. 1 Structure of coordinated backup protection scheme
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in traditional protection devices and the IEDs are based
on block-based design principle which makes it easy to
recombine or extend functions through standard module
interface.
CS protection is a distributed substation-domain pro-
tection, and its protection range is the elements within
the substation and outgoing-lines. Some coordinated
IEDs implement local rapid protection judgment and
other IEDs exchange information with adjacent substa-
tions for protection judgment of the outgoing-lines. If
primary equipment (CT/VT/CB) is in abnormal working
states, IEDs work in coordination mode and their data
sharing and coordinated tripping help to improve the re-
liability of local substation protection.2.2 Master substation (MS) protection
MS protection is a regional integrated backup protection
(RIBP) and its protection range is the network composed
of several CSs. The RIBP acquires every CS’s available data
through wide area communication network to analyze re-
gional comprehensive information. Likewise, if primary
equipment (CT/VT/CB) is in abnormal working states,
RIBP can acquire valid data through coordinated informa-
tion analysis in corresponding CS. For power systems up
to 110 kV, the protection scheme usually consists of single
main protection and has no breaker failure protection
[18]. The RIBP can help to realize dual-configuration pro-
tection and improve reliability. In addition, backup protec-
tion based on wide area information optimizes generalbackup protection in action time while still ensuring
reliability.
RIBP of MS parses the data packages and integrates all
the regional information. By analyzing the integrated
data, the protection algorithm unit calculates and out-
puts fault judgment results. Output tripping signals are
sent back to communication network to reach the corre-
sponding objective CS. Station level of CS obtains the
tripping signals and relative IED in process level sends
the tripping command to intelligent units (IU) and cir-
cuit breakers (CB) to isolate fault.
2.3 Communication network
In order to implement the CBP scheme, communication
network is one of the key technologies. The CBP com-
munication system includes three parts: process level
communication network within CS, network communi-
cated with adjacent substations, MS integrated data
communication network.
Process level communication network within CS is
shown in Fig. 1. Based on the IEC61850-9-2LE standard,
the communication between bay level and process level
is via high performance local area network (LAN) [7]
which is the process bus (SV + GOOSE). Considering
large quantities of information and network load cap-
acity, dual process network is set in CS (shown in Fig. 1).
The function module which is the protection calculation
part communicates with primary equipment through
LAN “SV +GOOSE A”. The coordination part, including
LCM and RCM, communicates with the same part from
other IEDs through LAN “SV +GOOSE B”. In order to
synchronize different data sources, LAN communication
needs have accurate GPS synchronous time-marker.
One CS can exchange information of outgoing-lines
with adjacent substations to implement cooperation
work among different substations. Network communi-
cated with adjacent substations uses synchronous digital
hierarchy (SDH) [19] technology and works in self-
healing ring transmission mode. The CSs and MS con-
nect with each other in a ring and flexible data acquisi-
tion is available. As shown in Fig. 2, CS_2 and CS_3
upload data to SDH network by SDH device, and CS_1
can download the necessary data from SDH network for
CS substation-domain protection judgment.
Because the quantity of multi-CS transmission data is
large and communication has high real-time require-
ment, MS integrated data communication network also
uses SDH technology as special communication network
of wide area protection (shown in Fig. 3). As communi-
cation network terminals, CS accomplishes local protec-
tion judgment and at the same time, its IEDs preprocess
the sample values and package necessary data. For those
data that needs to be synchronized, unified GPS syn-
chronous time-marker should be tagged to packaged
Fig. 2 Communication mode of adjacent substations
He et al. Protection and Control of Modern Power Systems  (2017) 2:10 Page 4 of 9message. All the shared data is uploaded to SDH net-
work through SDH method, and MS could download
the needed data from the network. Computer simulation
shows that SDH fiber communication network can
satisfy transmission delay requirements of WARP [19].
The latency is another concern, which includes the sen-
sor delay (5 ms), communication delay, processor compu-
tational time (dependent on the protection principle), and
circuit breaker operation time (90 ms). The communica-
tion delay of the process level is about 5 μs which is negli-
gible, whereas the possible longest communication delay
of wide-area optic fiber network is 24 ms. For regional dis-
tribution networks, the communication delay will not be
longer than 24 ms. Therefore, the protection principle
should ensure the calculation to be carried out efficiently
in order to isolate fault as soon as possible.3 Methods
CS protection implements local rapid fault judgment
and coordination working mode and can help to improve
protection reliability. MS integrated backup protection,
which is known as RIBP in previous discussion, analyzes
regional comprehensive information to recognize fault ef-
fectively in case CS protection fails to clear the fault.
The following discusses the detailed CS protection and
MS protection configuration principles.Fig. 3 Communication mode of MS3.1 CS protection based on differential principle
The principle of current differential protection is not af-
fected by changeable power flow. Therefore, this type of
protection can identify faults correctly and rapidly with-
out the need for VTs at every node to provide direction-
ality. In CS protection, differential principle is applied
and multiple IEDs can cooperate by information sharing
and function coordination to implement extended dif-
ferential protection. The basic principle is to use the
nearest non-fault data when local data has failure and
to broaden trip boundary when protection or breaker
does not operate correctly.
Based on the CS concept in Framework of coordin-
ation backup protection scheme section, the IEEE 14-
node system is divided into two substations (CS_1 and
CS_2) in Fig. 4, and the two CSs dispose substation do-
main protection separately based on differential principle.
As an example, fault 1 (F1) in the IEEE 14-node system as
shown in Fig. 4 is considered and the coordination
working mode is analyzed. In this paper, positive current
direction is defined as from bus to the line. _I 471 , _I 781 and
_I 791 are the first-terminal currents of line4-7, line7-8 and
line 7–9, respectively. _I 472 , _I 782 and _I 792 are the second-
terminal currents of the same three lines, respectively.
The basic differential current dif1 of line 7–8 is
_I 781 þ _I 782
  . If the local data _I 781 has failure, it can be
Fig. 4 IEEE 14-node system diagram
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ation with other IEDs. The information sharing is
achieved through the process bus LAN “SV +GOOSE B”,
and the differential current dif2 should change to
_I 782− _I 472 þ _I 791
   . Furthermore, the differential current
dif3 can also be expressed by replacing _I 472 with _I 471 .as
_I 782− _I 791 þ _I 471
 .
3.2 MS protection based on centralized searching
method
For a large-scale network, only some key nodes have
PMU measurements due to the cost. In general, those
key buses and buses having several feeders should be
regarded as the key nodes. As DG node voltages are ne-
cessary for their converter control and condition moni-
toring, the DG nodes should also be the key nodes.
When there is a fault in the network, node voltages
have no directionality according to fault sequence ana-
lysis. This is because that voltage drops occur at the
nodes at or around the fault and low voltage protections
will all act. The fault point has the lowest voltage and
voltage increases with the increase of the electrical dis-
tance. Thus voltage information can reflect fault location
to some extends, though when voltage data is only avail-
able at the key nodes, it is difficult to diagnose the fault.
Obviously, when there is a fault, most power from the
power sources will go to the fault point through a mini-
mum impedance path, referred to as the fault power
path in this paper. The fault power flow of this path is
the biggest and direction is to the fault point. Based on
the selection of the fault power path and search tree
model, together with current information comparison,
fault location can be identified effectively. Thus this
paper proposes a MS protection based on centralized
searching method, and based on that backup protection
can be realized.The key nodes sequence from initial results are searched
and the node with the maximum objective function value
(Z* shown in formula 1) is found to be the fault power
path. The termination condition is c ≥ (k + p + 1) where k
and p are the number of general key nodes and DG nodes
respectively.
Z ¼ Z xð Þ ¼
X
j





re _Ui:load  _I i:j:load
 
c ¼ cþ 1
s:t: re _Ui  _I i:j
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_Ui: voltage vector of node i
_I i:j: current vector of the line between node i and j
_Ui:load : voltage vector of node i (normal operation)
_I i:j:load : current vector of the line between node i and j
(normal operation)
re[ ]: calculation of real component
c: iteration counter
The second-step search appoints fault power path as
the search target and works to find the fault using
current information.
➀ When it is a node fault, voltage at the fault point is
approximately zero and the vector sum of the node cur-
rents is not zero based on Kirchhoff ’s current law. The
features discussed above can be used to judge node fault.
➁When it is a branch fault, the fault current flows
through non-fault branches which is the same as load
current. For the fault branch, the contralateral line
current is zero if it is a single-terminal power network.
On the contrary, if it is a double-terminal power net-
work, the contralateral line current is positive but the
direction information is hard to calculate due to the lack
of voltage data. Thus, a fault criterion based on current
data for double-terminal power network is necessary.
Neglect the line charging capacitance and system im-
pedance, line impedance and generator transient react-
ance are inductive. In this paper, phase angle change is
defined as the absolute value between the positive se-
quence component of the fault current and the non-
fault current. For the non-fault branch, the phase angle
changes of the two terminals are small whereas for the
fault branch, the phase angle change of one terminal is
small but the other is large. Thus the fault criterions
based on current information are given as
arg
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where, Arel is around 5
∘ ~ 10∘. The branch, whose

















Fig. 5 Differential currents with F1






























Fig. 6 Current phase changes of fault power path (F1 and ABC)
He et al. Protection and Control of Modern Power Systems  (2017) 2:10 Page 6 of 9two-terminal current data satisfies either criterion,
can be judged as the fault line. In this paper, the cri-
terion is named as two-terminal current phase com-
parison (TCPC) criterion for line protection. The
criterion needs no voltage data and fault judgment is
independent from directional element.
If the line is connected with single-terminal power sys-
tem, the second-terminal current of the feeder line is
compared with unbalanced current to judge whether it
is a line fault. If the line is connected with two-side
power system, line fault is judged by the TCPC criterion.
The second-terminal node is judged by bus differential
criterion to decide whether it is the fault node.Table 2 Evaluation data and result (portion) Current phase
changes of fault power path (Fault 1)
Fault
type
Positive sequence current phase change of A phase (degrees)3.3 Time coordination analysis
CS protection judges fault independently and coordin-
ation of information and functions helps to trip reliably.
The two-step search of MS protection needs small cal-
culation time, and thus the tripping output works with
minimum delay. When the CS protection has judgment
failure, backup protection will operate. However, if CS
protection needs coordination among many IEDs, time
required for communication and coordinated judgment
will be long and tripping output time may be longer
than that of the backup protection. In that case, the
backup protection should output tripping signals imme-
diately in order to clear the fault.Table 1 Voltage amplitude and objection function values of key
nodes (Fault 1)
Node 1 (DG) 4 5 6 (DG) 8 (DG)
ABC Voltage Amplitude (kV) 98.92 5.62 68.98 64.69 127.02
Z∗
(MW)
3.25 11.86 1.14 −9.85 04 Results
A test case using the IEEE 14-node network (shown in
Fig. 3) is simulated to evaluate the performance of the
CBP scheme. The IEEE 14-node network is a complex
radial network with 3 DGs. There are current trans-
formers (CT) at both terminals of the lines and only the
key nodes have voltage transformers (VT). As the net-
work is complex, markings of the CT/VTs are omitted
in Fig. 3. In this paper, it defines that VT is named by
the node number, and CT is named by the two-terminal
nodes and location terminal. For instance, U4 is the volt-
age of node 4, I471 is the current of line 4–7 at the node
4 terminal, and I472 is the current of line 4–7 at the node
7 terminal. Set 1, 4, 5, 6, 8 nodes as the key nodes and
the fault inception is at 0.3 s. Simulations are performed
using MATLAB. Measurement data is based on the re-
sults of power flow analysis and Gaussian random num-
ber (expectation is zero and variance is 0.01) is
superimposed as measurement error.
4.1 Fault 1
An ABC fault is applied at line 7–8 (fault 1). According
to the coordinated differential protection discussed in
Protection principles section the three differential cur-
rents (dif1, dif2, dif3) are calculated.|Δφ471| |Δφ472| |Δφ781| |Δφ782|
ABC 0.5637 0.5358 0.7231 107.1168
A to G 0.2223 0.2272 0.3313 105.9737
AB 0.1407 0.1495 0.2447 108.1144
AB to G 0.3501 0.3985 0.2281 106.8386
BC 0.1908 0.1366 0.2761 108.1041
BC to G 0.3799 0.3851 0.1861 106.8296
Table 3 Voltage amplitude and objection function values of key
nodes (Fault 2)
Node 1 (DG) 4 5 6 (DG) 8 (DG)
ABC Voltage Amplitude (kV) 98.44 3.79 68.09 63.74 127.02
Z∗
(MW)
2.52 7.40 −1.63 −9.92 0
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seen that the differential currents increase significantly
after fault occurrence. It is obvious that, differential pro-
tection using information sharing can judge the fault ef-
fectively. From the partial enlarged waveforms shown in
Fig. 5, differential current dif2 and dif3 have larger unbal-
ance currents compared with dif1. The reason is that in-
formation coordination brings greater measurement
error and distributed capacitance current [20]. In real
application, the unbalance current can be significant
considering IED communication error and data conver-
sion error. Thus, in order to maintain reliability, protec-
tion setting should consider the effect of information
sharing and coordination.
The MS protection based on centralized searching
method is applied in the same simulation case. The volt-
age amplitudes and first-search objection function values
are shown in Table 1. The key nodes by voltage ampli-
tudes are sorted and node 4 has the lowest value. The
key nodes are searched from node 4 and the maximum
objection function value is found to be at node 4. Thus
the fault power path is from node 4 which is then set as
the beginning node for the second-step search. The
phase angle changes of the fault power path are calcu-
lated and the two terminal phase angle changes of one
line are compared to judge the fault.
Figure 6 shows the current phase changes of the fault
power path. After the fault occurrence at 0.3 s, the phase





























Fig. 7 Current phase changes of fault power path (F2 and ABC)of the phase changes of I781 and I782 is about 108
∘.
Judged by the criterion in Test and results section, the
fault is on line 7–8 (fault 1).
In order to further analyze the accuracy of the criter-
ion, several typical fault types are tested and the two ter-
minal phase angle changes are compared. Table 2 shows
the current phase changes. Obviously, the fault criterion
can judge different faults accurately.
4.2 Fault 2
An ABC fault is applied at node 7 (fault 2). As the main
protection based on differential principle is simple and
reliable, this case only analyzes the MS protection based
on centralized searching method.
The voltage amplitudes and first-search objection
function values are shown in Table 3. The key nodes by
voltage amplitudes are sorted and node 4 has the lowest
value. The key nodes from node 4 are then searched and
the maximum objection function value is found to be at
node 4. Thus the fault power path is from node 4 and it
is the beginning node of the second-step search.
The phase angle changes of the fault power path are
calculated and the two terminal phase angle changes of
one line are compared to judge the fault. Figure 7 shows
the current phase changes of the fault power path. After
fault occurrence at 0.3 s, phase changes of I471 and I472
are almost identical and so as for I781 and I782. The line
fault criterion is not satisfied and thus it can be con-
cluded that there is no fault in lines 4–7 and 7–8. Ac-
cording to the second search, the currents sum of the
second terminal of line 4–7 is calculated and the result
is shown in Fig. 8.
The result in Fig. 8 shows that the node differential
current increases when fault occurs at 0.3 s. Thus it can
be identified that the second terminal of line 4–7 is the


























Fig. 8 Current sum (F2 and ABC)































Fig. 9 Current phase changes of fault power path (F3 and ABC)
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An ABC fault is applied at line 6–13 (fault 3). This case
also analyzes the MS protection based on centralized
searching method only.
The voltage amplitudes and first-search objection
function values are shown in Table 4. The key nodes by
voltage amplitudes are searched and node 6 has the low-
est value. The key nodes from node 6 are searched and
the maximum objection function value is found to be at
node 6. Thus the fault power path is from node 6 and it
is the beginning node of the second-step search. The
phase angle changes of the fault power path are calcu-
lated and the two terminal phase angle changes of one
line are compared to judge the fault.
Figure 9 shows the current phase changes of the fault
power path. After fault occurrence at 0.3 s, the sum of
the phase changes of I6131 and I6132 is about 122
∘. Judged
by the criterion in Test and results section, the fault is
identified to be on the line 6–13 which is fault 3.
5 Discussion
This paper presents the concept of coordinated backup
protection in order to solve the issues brought by trad-
itional backup protection and adapt to the changes of
distribution networks. The framework is discussed in-
cluding coordinated substation backup protection and
regional master substation backup protection, working
as nearby and remote backup protection respectively.
The cooperation of the two backup protections contrib-
utes to CBP’s higher reliability and better adaptability.
The communication network of CBP is fully explored inTable 4 Voltage amplitude and objection function values of key
nodes (Fault 3)
Node 1 (DG) 4 5 6 (DG) 8 (DG)
ABC Voltage Amplitude (kV) 117.66 124.90 104.29 73.05 127.02
Z∗
(MW)
0.94 −1.19 2.41 5.03 0the likely scenarios, including network within substation,
and communication network among adjacent substa-
tions and master substation.
6 Conclusions
The configuration principles of CBP consider the
changeable power flow and insufficient measuring quan-
tities in distribution networks. CS protection is based on
current differential principle and its coordination en-
sures the reliability of nearby backup protection. MS
protection is based on centralized searching protection
principle which analyzes integrated regional comprehen-
sive information.
From the simulation tests and results, the CBP scheme
can be seen as an effective and promising solution for
distribution network backup protection optimization.
The strong independence and high reliability of CBP can
help decrease the risk of protection malfunction.
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